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The debate about unilateral euroisation (i.e. the unilateral adoption of the euro
as legal tender) that emerged in CEECs at the end of the 1990s has finally ebbed
in 2000 following the very negative reaction of the EU officials.  We argue, however,
that we may potentially see a renewal of the debate in the future if the institu-
tional path set by EU to introduce the euro is not modified.  Indeed, both the
political and the economic context are now radically different from the ones existing
in 2000.  In this paper, two main lines of argument are developed.  First, the
credibility of (implicit) sanctions in the event of unilateral euroisation is currently
very low, even nil, because acceding countries are now de facto economically and
politically integrated into the EU.  Second, the recent economic slowdown and a
recovery that has not been as strong and fast as expected, have resulted in a halt
to the nominal convergence process that may delay their entry in EMU.  Given the
risk of unilateral euroisation, we argue that either consensual euroisation or, at
least, a relaxation of nominal convergence criteria would be a better option from
the viewpoint of both current and future members of EU.
JEL classifications: F33, F15, F02
I n conformity with their rights and obligations related to EUmembership, all acceding countries have now submitted to theofficials of EU both a prospective date to join EMU and a strategy
in order to reach it.  “Estonia and Cyprus aim at introducing the euro
early, in 2006 or 2007.  The other acceding countries favour a later adoption
of the euro.  Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia mention 2008 or 2009
as target years for joining the euro area, while the Czech Republic targets
euro adoption by 2009-2010.” (Italianer, 2003).  Indeed, by acceding to
EU, they enter as Member States with a derogation which provides
that, sooner or later, they will have to join EMU.  It should be recalled
that in the context of EU accession negotiations, they have not tried
to negotiate an “opting-out” clause, like the United Kingdom or
Denmark.  Adopting the euro as legal tender is truly the ultimate goal
of acceding countries and, in that sense, accession to EU is only an
intermediate step on the way.  
The vote of confidence in the euro by citizens of acceding countries
(more largely by citizens outside the euro area) is clearly illustrated by
their currency behaviour.  Tumpel-Gugerell (2003a) reports the following
features.  In the region of central and Eastern Europe, significant use of
the euro as a parallel currency (i.e. a currency to carry out transactions
or save) is made by private agents, alongside domestic currencies1.  The
euro banknotes in circulation outside the euro area are estimated to be
worth € 36 billion, accounting for around 10% of the total euro currency
in circulation.  Of this amount, an important share is thought to be circu-
lating in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular in the western Balkans.
The euro is used in paper form, but also in bank money form.  In most
countries of the western Balkans, the bulk of bank deposits is denom-
inated in euros while in most acceding countries the euro is the most
important foreign currency for the denomination of deposits.  Moreover,
data available for Bulgaria and Poland show that the euro is used as an
invoicing or settlement currency in the international trade of these
countries with the euro area.
The role of the euro on central and eastern European financial
markets is also noticeable.  For instance, in a number of countries
(especially the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia), the euro
accounts for a high share of foreign exchange turnover, which may
suggest that the euro plays a so-called “vehicle” role there (Tumpel-
Gugerell, 2003a).  This means that the euro may be used in the
exchange of two third currencies, or of the domestic currency into
another currency of the region.  As regards financing currency, countries
in the region have been active issuers of bonds in euros.  Since the
advent of the euro in 1999, total issuance by these countries has
amounted to more than € 30 billion.  Bond issuers have included private
companies and sovereign borrowers alike.
Finally, all acceding countries involved in the accession process have
an exchange rate regime with the euro as reference, ranging from
Currency Boards (Estonia, Lithuania) to managed floating (the Czech
and Slovak Republics, Slovenia)2.  Only Poland officially operates under
independent floating.  But even for countries under either managed or
independent floating there is evidence of “fear of floating” against the
euro as illustrated by substantial exchange rate market interventions by
the authorities of these countries over the last year (ECB, 2003)3.  
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1. Note that Tumpel-Gugerell (2003a) defines the region of “central and eastern Europe” in
a very broad geographic sense, since alongside the ten EU candidates, it “also includes the western
Balkans as well as the countries of the European part of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
such as Ukraine or Russia”.  
2. The official exchange rate regime of the Czech Republic has been reclassified by the IMF
(from independent to managed floating with the euro as reference currency) during the course
of 2003.  
3. So-called “fear of floating” describes a phenomenon by which even if the authorities of a
country officially declare their exchange rate system as floating, they seek to limit the movements
of their currencies (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
Moreover, adopting the euro seems truly the ultimate goal of both
citizens and authorities in acceding countries, the aim being full use of
the euro before the end of the decade.  The question therefore is not
whether the CEEC candidates will adopt the euro but when and how.
The EU legislation clearly defines the way towards the adoption of
the euro as a legal tender, according to a three-step institutional path.
The first step consists of the accession to EU, a step reached in May
2004 for all CEEC candidates except Bulgaria and Romania4.  In the
second step, the Member State must undertake procedures to partic-
ipate in the “new” Exchange Rate Mechanism (hereafter ERM-II), which
involves setting a central parity with the consent of EU officials and the
respect of fluctuation bands (probably set at +/–15 %) without deval-
uation.  The third step will begin when, after two years of membership
of ERM-II without tensions, the Member State will have passed the test
of nominal convergence criteria (the now famous Maastricht criteria),
evaluated over the last year preceding the examination.  Countries will
then be allowed, according to the EU legislation, to adopt the euro as
legal tender.  
The officials of the EU, especially in the European Commission and
the European Central Bank, stress the necessity to respect the afore-
mentioned steps5.  Two arguments are put forward by the EU officials:
(1) the need to achieve a high degree of nominal convergence before
adopting the euro; (2) the obligation to comply with the same entry
conditions as current euro-area Members (i.e. “principle of equal
treatment”).  
In our view, such insistent declarations made by EU officials on the
path to the adoption of the euro are better understood if they are
replaced in the context of the end of the last decade.  At that time,
an intense debate arose in CEECs concerning the option of unilateral
euroisation, that is a unilateral (and full) adoption of the euro as legal
tender.  Put differently, CEECs analysed the possibility of an early intro-
duction of the euro without respecting the institutional path defined in
the EU legislation.  Following the very negative reaction of EU officials
to this option, the debate ebbed considerably in candidate countries.
Indeed, in the late 1990s, unilateral euroisation would have weakened
the prospects of a quick accession to EU while the net economic gains
of unilateral euroisation were perceived as small (even negative) or
uncertain.  In any case, at that time most of candidate countries were
gradually converging towards the Maastricht criteria.  The debate is
currently being reopened in a country that is a candidate for EU
membership but not acceding in May 2004, namely Bulgaria.  
WHY NOT EUROISATION?
123
Special issue/April 2004
4. For Bulgaria and Romania, the accession to EU is delayed to 2007/2008 according to the
latest declarations from EU officials.  
5. See recent declarations of ECB (2003), Italianer (2003), Tumpel-Gugerell (2003a and
2003b).
The present article updates the previous literature on the issue of
euroisation.  Indeed, as noted by Backé and Wójcik (2002), the
momentum of change is considerable in candidate countries.  This
implies that the economic cost-benefit analysis of any policy’ choice
whether “to euroise or not to euroise” is shifting over time, and poten-
tially fairly dynamically.  A particular emphasis will be put on the
existence of political costs due to unilateral euroisation.  Indeed, the
EU arguments against euroisation are mainly legal: the stress is put on
the “institutional path” towards the euro, the “principle of equal
treatment”.  But is that a sufficient and relevant argument against euroi-
sation?   What credible sanctions could be imposed against a euroising
country?   Put differently, what is the scope for penalties that could
impose additional costs to be incorporated in the cost-benefit calcu-
lation of euroisation?   So far, the EU has not expressed any intentions
of penalty action vis-à-vis a euroising country.  No penalties were
imposed on Kosovo or Montenegro when they euroised.  
The remainder of the article is made up as follows.  The next section
gives some definitions of what “euroisation” means.  Then, after putting
the debate on euroisation in an historical perspective, we shall survey
the economic costs and benefits of unilateral euroisation in the current,
and also prospective, macroeconomic environment.  After that, we
focus on the credibility of EU sanctions and, related to this point, on
the costs and benefits for the EU of imposing penalties.  Finally, a
concluding section will consider the option of a consensual euroisation
between acceding countries and EU officials6.  Among acceding
countries, the analysis will focus primarily on the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland.  On the one hand, these three countries are the
largest acceding countries, so that a move towards euroisation by at
least one of them can affect small CEECs in their own decision to
“euroise or not to “euroise”.  On the other hand, the three biggest
countries show a sufficient degree of heterogeneity for a small country
to be able to find that its own situation fits in well with the situation
of one large country.
Sandrine Levasseur
124
Special issue/April 2004
6. As a result, the case of Bulgaria– candidate, not yet acceding to EU– will not be analysed
with any particular emphasis.  Indeed, alongside the difference in the institutional process of
integration to EU, the economic performance of Bulgaria is far from matching those of the
countries acceding in May 2004.  In this regard, Bulgaria is much closer to, say, Kosovo or
Montenegro, two territories operating under official euroisation.  For these reasons, the problems
of euroisation in this latter group are different from those of acceding countries and therefore
fall outside the scope of this article.  For an analysis of euroisation in Balkan economies, see Gros
(2002).  And for a special focus on Bulgaria, see, for instance, Kostov and Kostova (2002).
1. Some definitions
In broad terms, euroisation denotes the use of a foreign currency
(i.e. the euro) in the domestic monetary system of a non-issuer country.
“Euroisation” is then just an adaptation of the term “dollarisation”, used
to define the use of the dollar in non-issuer countries, essentially Latin
America economies.
Unofficial euroisation denotes a phenomenon where economic
agents voluntarily use the euro alongside the national currency.  The
spontaneous euroisation results from business concerns and is not a
deliberate government policy of unilateral adoption of the euro.  These
are typical examples of unofficial euroisation of the type reported in
the previous section7.
Unilateral (and official) euroisation is the unilateral decision of a
sovereign country to abandon its national currency partially or entirely
in favour of adopting the euro as legal tender without joining EMU.  In
other words, unilateral euroisation means transition to the euro without
having signed an appropriate agreement with the EMU member
countries and the relevant EU institutions.  Two main consequences
emerge from unilateral euroisation.  Under the current EU legislation,
(1) a country which euroises unilaterally does not participate in the
ECB’s monetary policy decision-making; (2) there is no lender of last
resort in countries euroising unilaterally in the event of a banking crisis.
Unilateral euroisation differs from the regulated introduction of the
euro, which implies membership in EMU and the resulting use of the
euro as legal tender and the right to issue the euro8.  The adoption of
the euro takes place under an agreement signed with the EU members
and institutions (the European Council, the European Commission and
the European Central Bank) and proceeds from the Treaties on the EU.
As already mentioned, the Treaties necessitate that the three steps of
the EU process be satisfied, and for the last step, that the nominal
convergence criteria be fulfilled.  The convergence criteria, known as
the Maastricht criteria, are summarised in Box 1.
Finally, in very broad terms, consensual euroisation can be defined
as an official introduction of the euro as legal tender, without respecting
the institutional path of EMU, but resulting from an agreement between
the euroising country and EU officials.  Consensual euroisation will be
defined more precisely in the concluding section.
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7. See also Eesti Pank (2002) for more details regarding the forms of spontaneous euroisation
in some CEECs.
8. A regulated introduction of the euro is sometimes labelled “contractual” euroisation.  In
what follows, we will use the terminology “euroisation” to denote all forms of adoption of the
euro short of the right of the adopting country to issue it.  Expressions such as “a regulated intro-
duction of the euro”, “institutional path for adopting euro” or “membership in EMU” will be used
to define an introduction of the euro in conformity with the current EU legislation.
1. The Maastricht convergence criteria
Before acceding to EMU (i.e. the third step of the European integration
process), EU Member States need to respect the following criteria:
(1) the criterion on price stability requires that a Member State has a price
performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over
a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more
than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member
States in terms of price stability.
(2) the criterion on long term interest rates requires that, observed over a
period of one year before the examination, a Member State has had an average
nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage
points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of
price stability.
(3) the criterion on the government budgetary position requires that a
Member State has a ratio of planned or actual government deficit to GDP that
does not exceed 3% unless: 
• either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a
level that comes close to the reference value,
• or, alternatively, the excess of the reference value is only exceptional and
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value.
(4) the criterion on government debt requires that a Member State has a
ratio of government debt to GDP that does not exceed 60%, unless the ratio
is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
pace.
(5) the criterion on exchange rates requires two things 
(a) participation for at least two years in the ERM-II, defined by (probably)
+/-15% fluctuation bands around central parity (i.e. criterion related to
functioning of mechanism)
(b) stability of the exchange rate, evaluated as +/–2.25% fluctuation around
central parity, under “normal” conditions  (i.e. criterion related to stability
of the exchange rate)
2. The debate on euroisation in
an historical perspective
The idea of an early introduction of the euro was first put forward
in December 1996 when the Slovenian Prime Minister said that
“Slovenia will do its best to join monetary union as soon as possible,
perhaps even before full EU membership”9.  This idea was dropped
fairly soon, however, after the EU had signalled that it would not appre-
ciate such an approach.  
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9. Quoted by Backé and Wójcik (2002).  This section constitutes a shorter and updated
version of their chronology on the debate about euroisation.
The euroisation debate remained dormant until early 1999 when
two economists, Bratkowski and Rostowski, proposed in a Polish daily
newspaper a rapid unilateral euroisation for Poland.  In the following
months, the public discussion about the issue gained some momentum
in other accession countries as well, like Estonia.  In the finance
ministries and the central banks of most candidate countries, the
hypothetical option of a speedy unilateral euroisation was examined at
a technical-economic level.  The conclusions were that (i) a unilateral
euroisation would not deliver systematically positive net benefits.
When the evidence of positive net benefits was certain, it appeared
that (ii) it would not make sense to take such a step against the wishes
of EU officials.  Other key conclusions were that the option of a
unilateral euroisation might be reconsidered in cases of either (iii) a
substantially delayed EU accession or (iv) a postponed entry in EMU
even though the respective accession country considers that it already
fulfils the Maastricht convergence criteria.  In our view, the latter
conclusion is important for the purpose of this paper because it points
to a political interpretation of Maastricht criteria, whose “vagueness”
permits fairly broad interpretation in some cases.
In reaction to the euroisation debate, the EU officials substantiated
their disapproval of the unilateral introduction of the euro in accession
countries during the course of 2000, focusing in their statements essen-
tially on institutional and legal arguments.  As noted by Backé et Wójcik
(2002), economic arguments appeared indirectly and in very general
terms by reference to “the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in
the [EC] Treaty”, but with no further elaboration, given that euroisation
as such is considered inconsistent with the Treaty, and thus not feasible
anyway.  The current official position has not evolved since.  
In the mid-2000, the debate on unilateral euroisation ebbed consid-
erably in most accession countries.  Only a few economists continued
to make proposals in this direction: Buiter and Grafe (2001), Bratkowski
and Rostowski (2001), and Coricelli (2001).  We attribute this vanishing
of interest in CEECs to the conjunction of two main phenomena.  First,
there were advances in the EU negotiation process, culminating in the
course of 2002 with (in June) the EU officials’ list of “winners” for the
next enlargement of EU and (in October) its date.  Second, good
economic performances since 1995 allowed for nominal convergence
in a fairly sustainable way.  Inflation was declining substantially from
two-digit to one-digit; public deficits were below the target of 3% of
GDP in most acceding countries; the level of public debt was very low.
Only long-term interest rates were far from the EU members’ level,
albeit on a substantially decreasing trend.  Consequently, at that time,
acceding countries had no interest in pursuing the agonizing path of
unilateral euroisation.  The political costs– not the economic costs–
were probably perceived as prohibitive in accession countries.  
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3. Costs and gains from unilateral euroisation:
an empirical overview
This section surveys the main costs and benefits related to euroi-
sation or, more generally, to the adoption of the euro.  Indeed, some
of them result from using the euro, regardless of the way in which it
is introduced in the economies.  Nevertheless, an accurate analysis
reveals some differences between unilateral and regulated introduction
of the euro.
3.1. The costs
The costs arising specifically from unilateral euroisation are generally
categorised as resulting from (i) a “money supply shock” due to insuf-
ficient reserves in euro; (ii) a loss of seigniorage revenues; (iii) the
absence of a lender of last resort in the event of a banking crisis.
Finally, the use of the euro, however it is introduced, induces (iv) inade-
quate responses of monetary and exchange rate policies to smooth
asymmetric shocks.
3.1.1. Once-and-for-all costs of money supply shock
From a pure macroeconomic viewpoint, one necessary and suffi-
cient condition for a successful unilateral euroisation is a sufficient level
of official foreign exchange reserves to replace the national currency.
However, this technical condition is not exempt from problems: which
monetary aggregate concept to use?  In the literature, no consensus
emerges.  According to Wójcik (2001), the main technical precondition
is that official international reserves cover the monetary base (currency
in circulation including vault cash and commercial bank reserves at the
central bank, i.e. M0).  By contrast, Gabrish (2002) argues that broad
concepts (i.e. M3) should be used because the demand for money trans-
actions is contemporaneously not precisely identifiable.  The problem
is that the central banks of candidate countries report only M1 and M2
data: a potentially large part of private savings in banks (for instance in
M3) is then unknown.  Alongside the official foreign exchange reserves,
the deposits denominated in foreign currency are often considered as
another precondition for a successful euroisation (Habib, 2002).  
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Inspection of Table 1 shows that official reserves currently suffice
to cover M1 at best (in Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Slovakia), but
clearly not M2.  In this latter regard, Romania and Bulgaria show a ratio
of 65-70% while other– and more developed– CEECs have lower
ratios, in the range 35-55 %.  Including the share of deposits denomi-
nated in foreign currency in the broad monetary aggregate improves
the picture in some acceding countries, especially in Slovenia and Estonia
where this share is between 30 and 40% of M2 (Table 2).  In Hungary,
Slovakia and Poland, the figures are around 15%, with the Czech
Republic exhibiting the lowest ratio (10%).  Interestingly, the share of
euro-denominated bank deposits in foreign deposits is appreciable in
most acceding CEECs and has shown a fairly dynamic increase between
2001 and 2002 (Table 3)10.  The two latter points are worth noting as
witnessing to an increasing vote of confidence in the euro, which in
turn reduces the need to consider a broad aggregate for ex ante
assessment of the technical feasibility of euroisation.  Considering the
narrowest aggregate (i.e. M0) then appears sufficient, without risk of
“money supply shock” due to an insufficient level of official reserves,
to match the money demand from private agents.  Moreover, based
on the latest available data for M0, unilateral euroisation can be made
with no devaluation at the time of transition towards the new legal
tender (Table 1).  
To conclude, there is no reason in our view why, technically
speaking, a well-implemented unilateral euroisation should impede the
normal course of current business.  Admittedly, euroisation is a
complete change in regime, so that private behaviour may be affected.
But it should be recalled that adopting the euro is a desire of the private
sector (both households and enterprises), as revealed by the degree of
unofficial euroisation in CEECs.  
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10. The low share of the euro in foreign deposits for Lithuania is explained by the Currency
Board arrangement based on the dollar up to February 2002 (and since then based on the euro),
and for Latvia, by the peg to the SDR.  Past colonial links of Cyprus and Malta with the United
Kingdom result in a non-negligible share of sterling in their foreign currency deposits.
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 End-2001 End-2002 
Cyprus 13.5 23.4 
Czech republic 50.9 59.6 
Estonia 50.4 62.7 
Hungary 41.0 58.1 
Latvia 15.7 19.4 
Lithuania 4.5 .. 
Malta 17.7 24.9 
Poland 27.2 28.3 
Slovak republic 43.3 59.6 
Slovenia 83.6 .. 
Bulgaria 29.3 32.3 
Romania 18.9 .. 
Turkey 25.6 27.0 
3.1.2. Loss of seigniorage revenues
One cost of unilateral euroisation (and also the more easily
quantifiable) is the loss of seigniorage revenues that accrue from the
issue of a legal tender.  Indeed, circulating cash represents a non-interest
obligation of the central bank, matched on its balance sheet by interest-
bearing reserve assets that are an ongoing source of revenue.  Unilateral
euroisation automatically terminates that revenue.  This contrasts with
a regulated introduction of the euro since EMU members participate
in the sharing of seigniorage revenues that derive from issuing the euro.  
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 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 27.2 50.4 43.6 39.2 39.1 40.0 .. .. .. 
Czech Republic 5.8 6.3 11.4 11.1 10.7 10.7 10.5 9.4 9.1 
Estonia .. .. .. 28.5 31.1 35.6 31.5 30.8 30.7 
Hungary .. .. 19.1 18.4 16.6 17.2 16.8 .. .. 
Slovenia .. .. .. 25.3 26.0 30.1 32.1 29.2 .. 
Slovak Republic .. .. .. 14.5 15.0 15.5 15.6 15.2 .. 
Poland 20.4 17.4 17.5 15.2 15.5 15.4 15.5 .. .. 
2. Ratio of deposits denominated in foreign currency to broad money (M2)
In %
Sources: Official national sources and selected issues of IMF country report; own calculations.
3. Share of euro-denominated bank deposits in foreign deposits
In %
Source: ECB (2003).
ia
ia
The seigniorage loss is traditionally divided in two parts: first, the
“stock cost” equal to the once-and-for-all expense of obtaining the new
notes and coins needed to replace local currency in circulation; second,
the “flow cost”, representing the continuing flow of income forgone
because the issuer country (or area in the case of the euro) pays no
interest to the adopting country.  Both stock and flow costs will be
smaller, the greater the degree of prior informal euroisation.
In what follows, we present a brief empirical overview of the
seigniorage issue from two perspectives: one related to unilateral euroi-
sation and the other to full membership in EMU.  Indeed, unilateral
euroisation induces a “dry loss”, since by abandoning its domestic
currency for the euro, the country loses seigniorage incomes without
any offsetting receipts.  By contrast, full membership in EMU involves
contribution to a pool of seigniorage income generated in the euro area
(whose technical terms are defined in the Statutes of the ECB) and a
redistribution from the pool to each national central bank.  Since the
share of contribution does not necessarily match the share of the
contribution, the net gains may be negative or positive11.
3.1.2.1. Estimates of seigniorage loss due to unilateral euroisation
According to the flow approach, losses of seigniorage revenues due
to unilateral euroisation are evaluated for the current period to be in
the range of 1-2% of GDP per year, depending on methodologies
and/or countries (Habib, 2001; Hochreiter and Rovelli (2002); Backé
and Wójcik, 2002 for a empirical survey)12.  Such losses are generally
judged quite low.  For comparison, the current income seigniorage
incomes in Western industrialised countries are put at just below 1%
of GDP.
Importantly, most empirical research shows a noticeable decrease
of seigniorage incomes in candidate countries since the beginning of the
transition process.  Focusing on opportunity cost measures, such a
decrease is due to the combined effect of falling interest rates and
reductions in minimum reserve requirements, which restricted the
monetary base (Habib, 2001).  Consequently, this cost due to unilateral
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11. The ECB Statutes (Articles 29 and 32 of Protocol No 18) stipulate that seigniorage income
is redistributed among all EMU member countries according to their respective capital shares in
the ECB.  The capital share is calculated from the country’s GDP and population share in EMU.
It therefore does not take into account the various contributions of the different members to the
overall holding of the euro.  Consequently, the pooling of seigniorage flows under EMU has dire
consequences for countries that operate with large currency holdings.
12. For a clear presentation of different concepts and measures of seigniorage incomes, see
for instance Hochreiter and Rovelli (2002).  Very briefly, the “opportunity cost” seigniorage is
constructed by multiplying a certain interest rate (used as a proxy for the return on the central
bank’s portfolio) by the (annual average) monetary base.  The “monetary” seigniorage is measured
and defined as the change in the (annual average) monetary base.  The two measures are the
same only when the nominal interest rate equals the growth of the monetary base.  For
memorandum, the monetary base is constituted by currency and bank reserves. 
euroisation should decline further in the medium term as a result of
the nominal convergence towards EU standards.  Schobert (2001) even
argues that seigniorage incomes are much lower than those indicated
by the traditional opportunity-cost-based approach.  Allowing for (1)
lower interest incomes earned on foreign currency assets, (2) interest
paid on sterilisation instruments and (3) the exchange-rate effect on
central banks’ balance sheets, Schobert (2001) shows that seigniorage
in the more developed CEECs (i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary
and Slovenia) has not played the intended revenue role since the second
half of the 1990s.  To sum up, the annual loss in seigniorage incomes
no longer appears to be relevant for the balance of costs and benefits
related to unilateral euroisation.  This contrasts with the once-and-for-
all cost of replacing the domestic currency.  Estimates are in the range
of 11-12% of GDP for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and
7-8% of GDP for Poland and Estonia (Habib, 2001; Sulling, 2002).  This
once-and-for-all cost constitutes one of the main obstacles to unilateral
euroisation, even justifying for some authors a sharing agreement with
the ECB (Habib, 2001; Gros, 2002).  On this latter point, see also the
concluding section.  
3.1.2.2. Estimates of seigniorage incomes due to membership in EMU
Empirical studies based on stock data show that full membership in
EMU would result in positive net gains for all candidate countries except
Malta and Cyprus (Feist, 2001; Fisher et al., 2002).  Indeed, most
accession countries are gainers in the redistribution of seigniorage
wealth while Germany, Austria and Spain are unambiguously losers.
Most accession countries enjoy per-capita gains of about 200-300 euros.
The highest per-capita gain is for Romania and the smallest for the
Czech Republic13.  For comparison, the per-capita loss is 400-500 euros
for Germany, Austria and Spain.
Note that these figures describe the once-and-for-all gain or loss of
seigniorage wealth associated with participation in EMU: they are not
annual values.  Feist (2001) argues that, among other things, it will be
seigniorage income based on a stock– not a flow– measure that will
play a part in the choice of EMU membership.  Indeed, assessing the
future seigniorage income flows necessitates making assumptions about
the evolution of the monetary base and interest rates, which is partic-
ularly intricate because of the very transitional situation of CEECs.  As
a result, empirical studies based on the “flow approach” are scarce and
depend heavily on the working assumptions, and we do not report the
empirical results of these studies14.
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13. The Romanian per-capita gain is around 400 euros in both Feist (2001) and Fisher et al.
(2002).  But the Czech per-capita gain is only 30 euros in Fisher et al. (2002) against 200 euros
in Feist (2001).  See Fisher et al. (2002) for a methodological discussion.
14. For instance, the reader is referred to Fisher et al. (2002) or Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2002).
3.1.3. The absence of a lender of last resort 
In the event of unilateral euroisation, domestic monetary authorities
can no longer act as a lender of last resort.  Costs arise since a euroising
country formally gives up a central bank capable of discounting freely
in times of financial crisis.  This makes a priori a difference from a
regulated introduction of the euro because in that case the ECB is
legally the lender of last resort15.  Nevertheless, Cohen (2003) argues
that the loss of a lender of last resort can be quite easily offset on a
unilateral basis.  Euroisation “reduces the overall need for international
reserves, since a share of external transactions that previously required
foreign exchange can now be treated as the equivalent of domestic trans-
actions.  A portion of the central bank’s assets therefore could be dedicated
instead to a public stabilization fund to help out domestic financial institu-
tions under stress” (Cohen, 2003).  Moreover, the absence of a lender
of last resort is somewhat mitigated by a high participation of foreign
institutions which may lend to their affiliates in troubled times (Backé
and Wójcik, 2002).  
Finally, the soundness of the financial sector appears as a necessary
condition for a successful euroisation.  While empirical evidence indicates
that banking sectors are still under-developed in CEECs compared to
EU countries, two important advances must be underlined.  First, over
the past few years, CEECs have intensified their efforts to bring about
structural reforms.  The privatisation of the commercial banking sector
is now largely complete in most acceding CEECs and, connected with
the privatisation process, the efficiency of the banking sector has
increased considerably (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003).  Banking sectors
in CEECs have been significantly re-capitalised and modernised (Méró
and Valentinyi, 2003).  Second, the statutory regulations governing risk
provisions have been tightened in the past few years and adapted to
international standards.  The Basle capital rules are now met.  For
instance, to comply with the so-called capital adequacy ratio, a risk-
weighted equity ratio of at least 8% must be maintained.  In 2001, this
ratio was between 11.9% in Slovenia and 19.6% in Slovakia (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2003).  Importantly, the non-performing loans which caused
financial crises in the 1990s have been reduced sharply in most acceding
countries.  Slovakia still exhibits poor performance with a 24.3% share
of non-performing loans in total bank loans while Estonia shows the best
performance with a corresponding share of 1.5% (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2003).  
The presence of foreign investors in the CEECs’ banking sectors
deserves special mention.  At the end of 2001, the share of bank assets
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15. More precisely, in the Treaty, there is no provision for the ECB to provide lender of last
resort liquidity (LOLR) to banks within the EMU.  Like the Bundesbank, it has, in fact, no LOLR
capability, being allowed only to lend to banks against EMU government securities (Bratkowski
and Rostowski, 2002).
owned by commercial banks that were predominantly in foreign hands
was over 60 %.  It was EU banks that were mainly attracted, accounting
for nine of the ten largest investors in this sector (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2003).  By spreading their banking expertise, foreign
investors made a significant contribution to consolidating the banking
landscape in CEECs (Mérö and Valentinyi, 2003; Deutsche Bundesbank,
2003).  As a result, the new parent companies contribute to a decrease
in the risk of a banking crisis.  Moreover, the strong presence of foreign
investors also decreases the risk of illiquidity in euro and hence the
potential costs due to the loss of lender of last resort in the event of
unilateral euroisation.  Indeed, having diversified portfolios, foreign
banks are less prone to shocks in the host country, and can then provide
more stable funding during turbulent time16.  As surveyed by Mérö and
Valentinyi (2003), “claims of foreign subsidiaries are not procyclical” and
“regarding the net impact on the stability of lending, most of papers suggest
a rather positive role of foreign banks”17.  In other words, no study
strongly supports the hypothesis of a withdrawal of foreign banks from
countries in trouble.  Interestingly, in the Baltic economies that operate
under a Currency Board (a softer version of unilateral euroisation),
limits put by this regime on the lender-of-last-resort function have
improved incentives for credit institutions and reined in moral hazard
(Barisitz, 2002)18.  Above all, sustained macrostabilisation as well as
effective structural reforms and privatisation proved essential in creating
preconditions for these successful “euroisations”.  
To conclude, for aforementioned reasons, the loss of a lender of
last resort does not appear a relevant argument against unilateral euroi-
sation by the CEECs.
3.1.4. Loss of independent monetary and exchange rate policies
Adopting the euro induces de facto the renunciation of independent
monetary and exchange rate policies.  Costs then arise from the
incapacity to smooth asymmetrical shocks by using these policies when
prices and wages are sluggish19.  These costs relating more generally
to the fixity of the exchange rate are typically in line with the tradi-
tional Optimum Currency Area theory.  According to this theory, a low
degree of asymmetrical shocks is then a sufficient condition for a
successful fixity of the exchange rate.  
WHY NOT EUROISATION?
135
Special issue/April 2004
16. Providing funds in “bad” times is reinforced by the need to maintain international reputa-
tions and by the existence of sunk costs due to FDI.  
17. Mérö and Valentinyi (2003) surveyed essentially evidence on Latin America countries.  The
only study for five CEECs (that of Haas and Lelyved, 2002) reaches similar conclusions.
18. More precisely, only Estonia and Lithuania are under an official Currency Board, whereas
Latvia is under a fixed exchange rate peg, but operating like a quasi-Currency Board.
19. A limited scope for anti-cyclical fiscal policy, as  will potentially be the case for EU acceding
countries due to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), increases the potential costs of loss of
monetary and exchange rate policies.
Empirical studies generally conclude that CEECs are not, and will
not be, exposed to severe asymmetric shocks in the future, or to desyn-
chronised business cycles with the EU20.  Poland, Hungary and Slovenia
show a high business-cycle synchronisation with the EU, while for the
Czech and Slovak Republics the degree of business-cycle synchroni-
sation is weaker but nevertheless increasing over time.  By contrast,
the business cycles of Romania exhibit no synchronisation with those
of the EU.
Two main features, to a large extent related, are usually put forward
in these studies.  First, the high level of trade between CEECs and EU
contributes substantially to their business-cycle synchronisation21.
Second, the degree of (a-)symmetrical shocks is endogenous with
respect to the process of monetary integration.  Fixity of the exchange
rate, by promoting trade, increases further the business-cycle synchro-
nisation (Frankel and Rose, 2000; Gaulier and Levasseur, 2001).  
To sum up, despite the existing market rigidities, there are no
important real costs for CEECs in  giving up independent monetary and
exchange rate policies22. 
3.2. The gains 
The potential benefits resulting from the use of the euro are tradi-
tionally categorised as follows: (i) greater price stability resulting from
importing credibility from the ECB; (ii) lower interest rates resulting
from elimination of the exchange rate risk premium; (iii) lower trans-
action costs; (iv) lower exposure to speculative attacks.
3.2.1. Greater price stability due to the importing of monetary
policy credibility
Adopting the euro will result in greater price stability.  The argument
goes as follows: euroising countries will “import” credibility from the
ECB, which has a stronger commitment to price stability than domestic
central banks of acceding countries.  
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20. For recent empirical studies, the reader is referred, for instance, to Jagric (2003), Süppel
(2003), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003).  
21. In our view, more than the level of trade, it is the very special nature of exports and
imports (i.e. a specialisation along the chain of value added) that explains the high degree of
business-cycle synchronisation (see concluding section).  See also Jagric (2003), which finds that
more synchronization is found in countries where greater internationalization of enterprises and
greater product and financial market linkages to EU markets are present.  
22. In this Special Issue, the reader is referred to Cazes (2004) for existing labour market
rigidities in CEECs, and Creel and Levasseur (2004) for an alternative evaluation of the costs
related to the renunciation of exchange rate and monetary policies.
This is not actually a very interesting argument because acceding
countries are now in the maturity phase of their transition process.
Inflation has been subdued rather successfully through various exchange
rate arrangements and monetary policy frameworks23.  The central
banks of acceding countries are now independent de jure and, more
importantly, de facto.  Deviations of inflation from targets seem to result
more from a problem of knowledge of the mechanisms of monetary
policy transmission (due to the transitional nature of these economies)
or possibly from mal-definition of targets, rather than central banks with
inflationary bias 24.  Currently, the monetary policy framework is
evolving in the right direction, with the same operational procedures as
in developed countries.  So, as regards price stability, we do not see
why the ECB should do better than the domestic central banks of
acceding countries.  This feature is important to mention since a major
argument against a regulated introduction of the euro made by some
is the insufficient “culture of monetary stability” in the acceding
countries.  
3.2.2. Lower interest rate due to a declining exchange rate risk
premium
Adopting the euro (i.e. fixing the exchange rate against euro) will
induce a fall in the interest rate due to the diminishing of the exchange
rate risks.  Roughly, the sole important exchange rate risk remaining
will be relative to the US dollar.  A lower risk premium, by bringing
about lower interest rates, will foster investment and then economic
growth.  Moreover, it will reduce the service of external and public
debt (Habib, 2001).
Assessing the gains in terms of the lower interest rates resulting
from unilateral euroisation is one of the most challenging exercises.
Based on past data, the awkwardness of this task arises partly from
difficulties of isolating the pure exchange rate risk from default risk, and
partly from estimating exchange rate expectations (Borowski, 2003).
However, the emerging consensus is that the Czech Republic would
gain the least from the introduction of the euro because the exchange
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23. For instance, there is no strong evidence that the Baltic economies with their currency
board arrangements do better in terms of price stability than other acceding countries under
more or less flexible exchange rate regimes.
24. Certainly, the bad experience of Poland in terms of inflation at the end of 90s was due
to a misleading definition of the objective.  Indeed, at that date, the vagueness of the medium-
term objective for inflation (“not above 4 %” for the end of 2003) was unable to have an effective
influence on inflationary expectations (OECD, 2001).  As a result, interest rates remained high
without successfully curbing inflation.  Since then, the objective for inflation has been clearly
specified (“2% in the medium run”), which gives more transparency and credibility in the conduct
of monetary policy.  While culminating at its highest levels in the course of 1999, the interest-
rate differential relative to the euro area is now decreasing steadily.
rate risk premium has been low for several years (Habib, 2000)25.  By
contrast, Poland would gain the most from the introduction of the euro,
especially if the benchmark period is the one of exchange rate floating
(Habib, 2000; Coricelli, 2002)26.  Finally, Hungary appears to be an
intermediate case27.  Interestingly, the low exchange rate risk premium
for the Czech Republic (compared to those for other countries) is
explained by the high degree of liquidity of its foreign exchange market,
which in turn is attributed to an early openness of its capital markets
compared to Hungary and Poland (Bulí, 2003; Herrmann and Jochem,
2003).  As a result, since full capital liberalisation is a prerequisite for
joining the EU, the exchange rate risk premium of other CEECs might
also decrease in the next few years.
Finally, it is worth noting that lower interest rates due to euroisation
would be achieved only if the decrease in the exchange rate risk
premium is not offset by an increase in the (perceived) default risk
(Gabrish, 2002; Wójcik, 2000).  As we argue in the concluding section,
a consensual euroisation (i.e. in accord with EU officials) would surely
eliminate the potential for an over-compensated rise in default risk, by
reassuring financial market participants.
3.2.3. Lower exposure to speculative attacks  
For acceding countries, “an early adoption of the euro would ward off
the danger of currency crises during the approach to EMU” (Habib, 2002).
Indeed, the sustainability of ERM-II might be difficult in the context of
a fully liberalised capital account, even if sound economic policies are
implemented.  In terms of exchange rate arrangements, only the so-
called “two corner solutions”, with either irrevocably fixed or
independently floating exchange rates, are often viewed as viable
options in a world of free capital mobility.  In this regard, two country
cases are particularly illustrative: Greece and Hungary.
Greece is among the less developed of present EMU members and,
in this respect, close to acceding countries.  In the two years before
membership in EMU, the volatility of its currency increased substan-
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25. Note that since mid-2000 the short-term interest rate differential between the Czech
Republic and the euro area has been almost nil.  And since mid-2002, the differential in long-term
interest rates for (comparable) government bonds between the Czech Republic and the euro area
has been negative.
26. Note however that the time span for assessing the currency risk premium of Zloty is not
a trivial issue.  Over the period from May 1997 to October 2000, Wójcik (2000) estimates the
average fall in the short-term Polish nominal interest rates due to the elimination of exchange rate
premium to be 5.5 percentage points.  For the floating exchange rate period of his sample, from
April to October 2000, the fall is around 8 percentage points.  For another period of floating
exchange rates, from January to September 2002, Borowski (2003) evaluates the currency risk
premium for Poland at “only” 150 or 200 basis points.  See arguments of Borowski (2003) for
the most appropriate reference period to gauge the currency risk premium in Poland.  
27. The most recent assessment of the currency risk premium for Hungary ranges from 150
to 300 basis points (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2002).
tially despite a major improvement in fiscal discipline.  More precisely,
“upon entering ERM-II, Greece devalued the drachma by about 13 percent.
Such initial depreciation was followed by a quick reversal and a shift towards
the lower end of the band.  During the two years of ERM-II the drachma
was stuck in the lower portion of the band [i.e. appreciated].  As a result,
the parity negotiated for the entrance into the euro was revalued”.  (…)
“The decline of domestic [interest] rates was very slow, and accelerated
only when the entry into the euro approached.  Even then, however, a signif-
icant spread with respect to the euro interest rates persisted” (Coricelli,
2002)28.  As underlined by Coricelli (2002), the parity chosen for entry
into ERM-II is likely to become a ceiling for actual exchange rate
movements, meaning that countries will tend towards the lower (appre-
ciated) part of the band.  The line of reasoning is twofold.  As the
parity cannot be devalued (in the context of ERM-II), expectations of
inability to enter the euro would mount, creating a self-fulfilling process
of weakening currency.  This induces corrective actions by the central
bank in order to support the exchange rate, namely high interest rates.
The second, and more likely outcome, is that the country anticipates
these potential difficulties by using monetary policy to achieve a “strong”
currency.  Through high interest rates, the exchange rate will be kept
in the lower section of the band (i.e. appreciation).  At the end of
ERM-II, the parity can either be maintained or re-valued.  Part of the
mechanism goes under the heading of the so-called “convergence play”,
whereby foreign investors speculate on the value of the parity that will
be chosen at the end of the two years and on the capital gains accruing
from the decline in nominal interest rates on fixed income bonds.
Coricelli (2002) therefore calls ERM-II a “trap”.
The recent experience of Hungary constitutes another interesting
case. Hungary’s present exchange rate arrangement mimics the ERM-II
in most of its aspects.  The forint is pegged to the euro within fluctu-
ation bands of +/-15% (since May 2001) with no pre-announced
devaluation (since October 2001)29.  Figure 1 illustrates, as in the case
of the drachma, the tendency of the currency to be in the lower (appre-
ciated) part of the band since the beginning of the exchange rate
arrangement.  After a rather tranquil period, the appreciation of the
forint substantially accelerated following the “yes” vote in the Irish refer-
endum on 19 October 2002, which reassured market participants on
the future enlargement of the EU.  Capital then started to pour into
Hungary, attracted by a large interest gap between Hungary and the
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28. At the end of August 2000, that is, four months before Greece entered EMU, the spread
was still around 200 basis points.
29. The two main differences between the Hungary’s current exchange rate arrangement and
ERM-II are as follows.  First, in the context of ERM-II, the parity cannot be devalued, while the
National Bank of Hungary at present has discretion concerning this option.  Second, the ECB
currently has no obligation to intervene at the margins as will be the case in ERM-II.  The ECB
may however decide to suspend interventions if it is deemed that these actions interfere with the
primary objective of price stability.
euro area as well as other acceding countries, causing an appreciation
of the forint.  Neither the interest rate cuts, nor the growing current-
account deficit, succeeded in stopping the forint’s appreciation.  On
15th January 2003, the boundary of its trading band was reached
(Figure 1) due to the action of a group of foreign banks.  Hungarian
monetary authorities then intervened extensively on the exchange-rate
market to fight the speculative attack in favour of the appreciation–
not depreciation– of the forint30.  Moreover, they cut the key two-week
deposit rate by 200 basis points, from 8.5% to 6.5% (Figure 2).
Thereafter, the forint remained broadly stable until the end of May 2003,
when the currency showed the first signs of weakness, in a context of
growing twin deficits.  In the course of June 2003, the Hungarian central
bank first decided an (unexpected) devaluation of the central parity of
the forint by 2.2% (Figure 1) and two hikes in its key interest rate bringing
the short-term interest rate differential against the euro area to 750 basis
points (Figure 2).  The latter actions were supported by arguments that,
to keep inflation in line with the bank’s target, the exchange rate would
have to strengthen against the euro.  Indeed, Hungary is a small open
economy where the exchange rate’s channel of monetary policy trans-
mission dominates that of the interest ’rate.  For some time, the high
interest-rate differential contributed to a reinforcement of the forint.  At
the end of November 2003, after several weeks of depreciation in the
forint, the Hungarian central bank decided again to increase the key rate
by 300 basis points.  Its argument was as follows: “the spending overrun
in general government and the household sector can only be financed through
the inclusion of external sources of massive funds” and “foreign investors
are only willing to secure the funds needed (…) at a higher price”.
Moreover, “the depreciation of the forint’s exchange rate offers no solution
to the problem of how the current account deficit should be reduced.  Such
a  depreciation would only increase inflation which in turn would (…) cause
several years delay in the adoption of the euro in Hungary” (Press Releases
of HNB, 28 November 2003).
Certainly, while the monetary authorities recognised that the deval-
uation of June was a mistake, the Hungarian experience constitutes a
good illustration of how a mechanism like ERM-II can be difficult to
manage for a catching-up economy, which in addition must fulfil other–
and somewhat contradictory– targets.  The interest rate is intensely
manipulated and, especially, kept high in order to obtain an appreci-
ation in the currency, which in turn allows disinflation to be imported.
In this respect, euroisation would make it possible to obtain lower
interest rates and to avoid other traps in the Maastricht criteria.
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30. On 15th January, the Hungarian central bank had to sell a total of HUF 213 billion (for
EUR 908 million) to defend the band (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2003).
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Moreover, the Hungarian experience clearly illustrates how a
mechanism like ERM-II– a fixed but adjustable exchange rate
mechanism– can be difficult to sustain in a context of fully liberalised
capital movements, leading market participants to test the boundaries
independently of fundamentals, as already exhibited by the ERM crisis
of 1992/1993, which led to a widening of fluctuation band from
+/-2.5% to +/-15%31.  Note that the Hungarian experience is pointed
to by the Czech National Bank to justify a presence in ERM-II for the
minimal time period of two years.  The argument goes as follows.
Staying in the ERM-II for longer is not deemed desirable or beneficial
to macroeconomic stability, because “participation in the ERM-II alone–
unlike the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate within the monetary union–
does not in itself eliminate the risk of currency turbulences” (CNB 2003).  
Capital flows could certainly become a source of concern for
acceding countries (Begg et al., 2003).  Membership in EU implies full
liberalisation of the capital account, which is expected to have a signif-
icant impact on portfolio and short-term capital flows because these
capital flows have so far remained relatively restricted32.  And there is
empirical evidence that short-term capital flows are the most volatile
type of capital investment (Buch and Lusinyan, 2002).  Stability of the
exchange rate might then be put at risk, with rising short-term capital
inflows and, as a corollary, with outflows resulting from a shift in market
sentiment.  
To sum up, an acceding country experiencing much turbulence under
the ERM-II arrangement would benefit from euroisation, by suppressing
macroeconomic instability not based on fundamentals and, in a related
manner, by gaining from lower interest rates.  
3.2.4. Lower transaction costs due to the use
of a common currency
Lower transaction costs due to the use of a common currency arise
mainly from the elimination of exchange rate risk.  Such benefits are
both direct and indirect.  The direct benefit is that real resources that
would have been devoted to managing this risk can now be channelled
to other productive uses.  The indirect benefit is that trade between
countries using the same currency increases.  Indeed, there is some
empirical evidence that trade expands between members of a currency
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31. The position of the Hungarian monetary authorities concerning the speculative attack on
the forint on 15th January 2003 is clear: “The speculation against the forint’s band was unjustified
and irrational.  (…) Buy orders for large amounts on forint on the day in question had been placed by
eight major foreign banks, many of which have subsidiaries in Hungary.  Thus the speculative attack
was mounted by these foreign banks, or rather the clients they represent” (Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
2003).
32. See, for instance, Buch and Lusinyan (2002) or Begg et al. (2003) for a description of
capital account liberalisation in CEECs.
union (Frankel and Rose, 2002; Glick and Rose, 2002) and we take it
as axiomatic that trade enhances wealth.  Note however that the
increase in trade resulting from currency union has been probably over-
estimated, as demonstrated by very recent empirical work.  More than
the adoption of euro, membership of the EU, by suppressing all tariff
and non-tariff barriers, is proved to expand trade between members
(Box 2).
The use of a single unit of account definitely makes prices more
transparent, which in turn increases cross-country competition.  But,
similarly, such benefits are probably exaggerated in economic discussion
(Coricelli, 2002).
2. What is the “true” effect of a currency union on trade?   
The issue of selection bias
Many studies analysing the potential benefits for candidate countries of
adopting the euro assume a sharp increase in trade with EU, due to the use
of the single currency unit (Borowski, 2003, for instance).  To a very large
extent, such an assumption is based on the empirical findings of Rose (2000),
Frankel and Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2002): countries using the same
currency trade up to three times more with each other than similar countries
using different currencies.  Moreover, such an increase in trade is conducive to
higher growth.  
However, such an increase in trade (and the subsequent positive effect on
growth) is probably greatly over-estimated.  Indeed, other recent studies argue
in this direction.  For instance, the original Rose data set has been re-analysed
by Persson (2002), who shows that the magnitude of a currency union effect
is sensitive to selection bias; by Nitsch (2001), who claims that countries
adopting the US dollar enjoy no increase in trade and that “the estimates of the
trade-enhancing effect of establishing a currency union are, at best, unreliable”; by
Thom and Walsh (2002), who again find in favour of a selection bias.  Certainly,
the use of a common currency increases trade between countries sharing that
currency, but not in the proportions found by Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose
(2000), Glick and Rose (2002).  
The core explanation of the over-estimation is the “selection bias”, which
can be easily understood without resorting to technical and econometrical
considerations, by summarising the explanation of Thom and Walsh (2002).
They argue that in the Glick and Rose study, (i) the poorest and least stable
countries of the world predominate in their list of currency union’ members
(over 250 of their 376 unions) and (ii) that all of the unions involving these
countries were legacies of an explicit or implicit colonial past.  Many of these
unions ended as part of a bloody decolonising process, followed by the adoption
of Marxist/autarkic policies, bilateral trade deals with the Soviet Union or China,
and a descent into economic chaos.  In many cases, it is very likely that trade
between the former currency union partners would have collapsed regardless
of the currency regime in force.  The main econometrical problem is then to
isolate the currency union effect from these contaminating influences.  There
is a bias because there are “very few currency unions between two independent,
developed countries that ended under [normal] conditions” in their data set (Thom
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and Walsh, 2002).  Then, focusing on a study case (i.e. Anglo/Irish trade) to
analyse the broken link between the Irish punt and sterling in 1979 (i.e. a
currency union that ended under “normal” conditions), they find no effect of
a currency union between these “independent countries that enjoyed normal
economic relations before and after the event” (Thom and Walsh, 2002).  Proximity
of countries, combined with EU membership, mostly explains why there is no
break in the trade between the two countries following the event.  De Nardis
and Vicarelli (2003) conclude in the same vein: decades of integration policies
in Europe, more than the adoption of the euro, explain the increase of bilateral
trade (the effect of the euro’s adoption on bilateral trade is only 9-10 %).
3.3. Balancing costs and benefits from euroisation
against a regulated introduction of the euro:
summary and challenges ahead
Balancing economic costs and benefits of the two options is a very
intricate exercise, as stressed by Backé et Wójcik (2002).  However,
the following general conclusion can be drawn from an overview of the
empirical literature.  The loss of seigniorage incomes (especially, the
once-and-for-all cost) and the reduction in risk premia are the two main
factors in the economic cost-benefit analysis of euroisation.  As previ-
ously underlined by Habib (2001), “potential benefits from euroisation–
stemming from the reduction of risk premia– could compensate for these
costs”.  The difficulty is that, while seigniorage incomes are rather easy
to assess, estimating the decrease of risk premia is challenging.  
Note that few of the aforementioned empirical studies conclude in
favour of unilateral euroisation, or even consensual euroisation, for
acceding countries.  The sole notable exceptions are Bratkowski and
Rostowski (2001), Coricelli (2002) and Sulling (2002, for Estonia). These
authors excepted, the general conclusion is that positive net gains
resulting from unilateral euroisation are either too small or uncertain
for getting involved in this way.  To some extent, such a conclusion is
currently still relevant without the support of EU officials.  However, in
our view the key issue is not the current economic environment, but
the prospective one.  Therefore, in what follows, we consider which
economic factors might impede the observance of the Maastricht
criteria in the next few years, at the time of the examination for entering
step three of EU33.  
First, the inflation criterion may be difficult to meet, as the Balassa-
Samuelson (BS) effect acts as a floor to inflation rates in catching-up
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33. The Maastricht criteria are summarised in Box 1.  For past evolution of the Maastricht
criteria in acceding countries, the reader is referred to Fitoussi and Le Cacheux (2003) in this
Special Issue.
economies.  Granted, there is some uncertainty as to the exact size of
this effect34.  However, higher inflation performances in the less
developed countries of the euro area (Spain, Ireland, Portugal and
Greece) compared to the more advanced ones show clearly that the
BS effect is at work in catching-up economies.  Moreover, the share of
administrated prices is currently still high in some countries35.  Sooner
or later, because of EU membership, these prices would have to be
liberalised.  Alongside these two structural factors, strong price
increases for foodstuffs and/or petroleum may result in additional diffi-
culties in curbing inflation.  Indeed, because of the high share of the
agricultural sector and more energy-intensive production technologies,
inflation in CEECs exhibits more responsiveness to oil price fluctuations
than in euro area members (Backé et al., 2002; Arratibel et al., 2002).
Second, a deterioration in public finances has been observed in the
past few years in some acceding countries.  While this is partly due to
the economic slowdown and to the fact that recovery is not as great
or as fast as expected, more structural factors also explain the drift of
public finances in most CEECs36.  Admittedly, to satisfy the Stability and
Growth Pact, countries have planned structural fiscal reforms aimed at
reducing public deficits and hence public debt in the future.  But diffi-
culties in fulfilling fiscal criteria might be exacerbated by population
ageing and spending pressures stemming from the compliance with EU
environmental standards and the receipt of EU development funds (as
these require domestic co-financing).
Third, long-term interest rates have continued to increase since
November 2003 in Poland, and to a lesser extent, in Hungary.  Financing
public debt is now much more costly than in the past.  The conver-
gence process in long-term interest rates between some CEECs and
the euro area appears to be marking time, owing to the combined
effect of increasing public deficits and insufficient credibility of fiscal
reform proposals in a context of sluggish economic growth.
Fourth, the sustainability of ERM-II may be endangered by the B-S
effect and capital flows.  Importantly, an exchange rate stability criterion
based on +/-2.25% bands (i.e. narrower bands than those for the
functioning of ERM-II) might be particularly difficult to fulfil.  In this
respect, at the time of examination for entry into EMU, the interpre-
tation of what constitute “normal conditions” or “tensions” might give
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34. In a developing economy, one which is catching up with the income levels in the more
advanced countries, productivity in the sectors producing tradeable goods will tend to rise faster
than in those producing non-tradeables. Since wage increases tend to be more or less the same
in all sectors, inflation will be relatively higher in the non-tradeables sector. This so-called “Balassa-
Samuelson” effect will lead to a higher inflation rate in developing country than in developed
country but also to a real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
35. See J. Creel and S. Levasseur (2004), in this Special Issue.
36. The drift in public finances is documented for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
by Creel and Levasseur (2004).
rise to intense discussions between candidates and EU officials.
Consider for instance the recent declaration by Mr. Jan Frait, Board
Member of the Czech National Bank: “The position of the candidate
countries towards the ERM2 differs from that of the European Commission
and the European Central Bank.  Personally, I cannot see any value added
in using the ERM2 regime.  The Czech Republic stabilises inflation by means
of inflation targeting, and the ERM2 can hardly be a tool for stabilising
the nominal exchange rate.  The width of the band (+/-15%) is too large,
intra-marginal interventions by the ECB are unlikely, and marginal inter-
vention by the ECB cannot be guaranteed.  Under such circumstances the
agreed central parity in the narrower range of +/-2.25% would be prone
to destabilising testing by the foreign exchange markets” (Frait, 2003).
More generally, “vagueness” in the definition of Maastricht criteria
might result in quarrels over their interpretation, as illustrated at the
time of examination for present EMU members.  Very recently, the
ECB has pointed out again that “there will be no relaxation of the criteria
laid out in the Treaty” (ECB, 2003a).  Then, arguing that at some points
of time since EMU membership some euro area members have not
fulfilled the Maastricht criteria (e.g. France and Germany for the
government deficit criterion; Spain, Ireland, Portugal and the
Netherlands for the inflation criterion), political crises might result from
too strict an interpretation of criteria by EU officials, increasing the
incentives for a failed candidate to euroise unilaterally.  To conclude, if
there exists some rationality in defending the “institutional path” for the
introduction of the euro– which still has to be demonstrated, as will
be argued in the next section– the EU officials would be better advised
to relax to some extent the nominal convergence criteria and so reduce
the risk of unilateral euroisation.  
4. The issue of EU threats and
costs/benefits for EU
This section is devoted to examining how EU officials can actively
discourage acceding countries from adopting the euro without
respecting the “institutional path” defined in the EU legislation.  Finally,
it appears that the credibility of (implicit) sanctions threatened by the
EU officials depends crucially on the costs and benefits of euroisation
in acceding countries for present EU members.
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4.1. The legal void: the absence of explicit sanctions
First at all, note that, to our knowledge, there is no explicit mention
in the existing EU Treaties of sanctions to be taken against a country
euroising unilaterally.  Moreover, the draft Constitution for Europe–
which will encompass all the previous Treaties– does not specify
sanctions that EU could impose on a country that does not respect the
“institutional path for adopting the euro”.  For instance, the “exit”
option is only on the initiative of the Member State itself.  Nothing is
specified on the possibility that a provision could be activated to force
a Member State to withdraw if it does not respect the “institutional
path” for adopting the euro stressed by all EU officials.  Thus, from a
legal viewpoint, there is a void and sanctions can be only implicit or
indirect, via the activation of other provisions of the Treaties.  One
consequence is that, due to the intricacy of EU legislation, implicit
sanctions may be difficult both to define and to implement, finally losing
their credibility.  Consider the following example.  Given the current
openness of world trade– both in goods and in assets– the euro area
can hardly prevent its currency from crossing the borders of a poten-
tially euroising country, except by resorting to capital controls.  The
problem is that, legally speaking, capital controls against one EU
Member State (i.e. the potentially euroising country) are contrary to
another pillar of EU legislation, namely the free movement of capital.
Of course, present members can always refer to some European
“court” (e.g. the European Commission), arguing that “euroisation” is
contrary to the obligations related to EU membership, but at the risk
of a long and unpredictable legal procedure.
And anyway, in that case, the sanctions would intervene ex post not
ex ante.  Potentially, ex post implicit sanctions might take the form of
cuts in EU structural funds, exclusion from all subsequent negotiations
related to the  functioning of EU current business and so on, arguing
legally, for instance, that since the Member State is deviating from obliga-
tions related to EU membership, there is no reason that other Member
States should respect its rights associated with EU membership.
Ultimately, the sanction imposed by other Member States might be a
proposal to expel the euroising country from the EU.  Indeed, because
legislation is continually evolving, one could imagine an amendment to
the Constitution stipulating a provision for the expulsion of one
member state initiated by other members in certain circumstances.  But
is this a “credible” threat?    Is it sufficient to discourage a country from
euroising its monetary system unilaterally when, from the economic and
technical viewpoints, such an option does not involve too much risk
for the euroising country?  
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4.2. The lack of credibility of (implicit) sanctions
It is important that the EU should have some sort of credible threat
in order to prevent another country from adopting unilaterally the euro
and “a credible threat is one which, if carried out, would harm the adopting
country but would not hurt the issuing country” (Altig, 2002).  To take
again the issue of capital controls– but ignoring the legal problems, now
assumed to have been solved– it seems to us rather difficult to imagine
that EU members would not be hurt by such a decision.  Capital
controls would necessarily have feedback effects on other sectors of
the economy, disrupting trade and then production in both euroising
and present EU countries.  It can be argued at first sight that, due to
the small economic size of acceding countries relative to the present
EU, the adverse feedback on existing EU members would be quite
limited.  Candidate countries as a whole accounted for 16% of total
extra-EU exports and for 11.5% of total extra-EU imports in 2000
(latest available homogenous disaggregated data).  Four countries (the
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Turkey) account individually for
at least 20% of EU exports to candidate countries and 15% of EU
imports from candidate countries37.  Germany accounts for more than
40% of total extra-EU imports and exports.  According to these trade
data, the “problem” of euroising countries is then restricted to the four
aforementioned countries and, among present members, is largely a
matter for Germany. Nevertheless, going beyond the trade level, what
we need to consider are the characteristics of trade between CEECs
and all present members.  Indeed, owing to the impetus of European
Association agreements and a legislation favourable to FDI during the
1990s, the EU multinationals are currently very present in CEECs,
especially for operations involving fragmentation of their productive
processes38.  As a result, EU multinationals account for a large part of
both imports and exports in the acceding countries. Cutting EU multi-
nationals off from these trade activities could be costly, if it is FDI in
CEECs driven by cost considerations that makes it possible to maintain
the whole chain of production, including activities (stages) in the multi-
national’s home country.  More generally, both the private and public
sectors of present EU countries have strong interests in CEECs,
including financial ones.  For instance, a large share of the CEECs’
external debt is purchased by EU investors (ECB, 2003b).  In our view,
therefore, current high degree of economic and financial integration
with acceding countries explains why EU officials have low credibility in
their (implicit) sanctions.  Since the degree of integration is expected
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37. Gros (2002) notes that euroisation of Turkey would not have been worse than the stabi-
lisation programmes recommended by the IMF for that country.
38. International fragmentation describes a productive organisation in which the stages
intensive in capital and R&D, remain in the (developed) home country of the multinational while
stages intensive in natural resources and labour are realised in the (less developed) host countries.
to increase further with the formal accession to EU, the credibility of
sanctions is expected to decrease even further.
As noted by Altig (2002), explicit examples of what active and
credible resistance might mean are harder to find.  Note that passive
acceptance (i.e. neither encouraging nor discouraging currency
adoption) would be currently the best description of the United States
policy towards dollarisation in Latin America.  Altig (2002) explains the
United States’ attitude by an alignment in the interests of both adopting
and issuing countries.  “If dollarisation is beneficial to the adopting country,
it is hard to see how it can fail to benefit the issuing country [and] if dollar-
isation is destabilizing or harmful to the adoption country, it is hard to see
how it can be benefit the issuing country” (Altig, 2002).  First, trade
integration between the dollarised economies and the United States
contributes to a large extent to the alignment in their interests. Second,
in the case of unilateral dollarisation, the seigniorage incomes are a pure
gain for the United States39.  These factors explain the passive
acceptance of dollarisation by the United States.  Altig (2002) even
argues that active encouragement would be not a good option from
the viewpoint of the United States.  It would mean, for instance, an
arrangement for the sharing of seigniorage incomes or the right for
adopting country to participate in the conduct of monetary policy.  In
what follows, we take as axiomatic that “the interests of adopting and
issuing countries are aligned”.  
5. Conclusion: Proposal for consensual
euroisation 
What response should the EU officials adopt faced with the wish of
some countries to euroise?    In the absence of credible sanctions,
either a passive acceptance (like that of the United States) or a
consensual euroisation are the two possible EU attitudes.  At first sight,
consensual euroisation would be a better option than unilateral euroi-
sation, with advantages for both euroising countries and present
members of EU.
Consider the (very vague) economic arguments developed by the
EU officials in favour of a regulated introduction of the euro.  For
instance, “The decisions regarding the timing of entry and duration of
participation in ERM-II should be based on the extent to which participation
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39. For the United States, seigniorage incomes if all South America and Mexico were “dolla-
rised” are put at 0.2-0.8% of US GDP per year (Altig, 2002).
in the mechanism enhances the prospects of achieving a lasting conver-
gence of economic fundamentals.  The overall goal of this process should
be to foster macroeconomic stability in the new Member States, thereby
providing the best possible contribution to sustainable growth and real
convergence.  New member States should also consider the extent to which
the limitation of exchange rate flexibility may help anchor expectations and
promote the pursuit of sound macroeconomic and structural policies, thus
fostering real and nominal convergence.  While participation in ERM-II per
se does not ensure supportive and consistent macroeconomic and structural
policies, it has the potential to act as a catalyst, enhancing the disciplinary
effect of such policies” (ECB, 2003, p. 5, underlining by the author).  In
summary, nominal criteria are set in order to ensure a sustainable
nominal and real convergence with the present EMU members.
Somewhat ironically, a well-guided euroisation would make it easier
to attain these goals, especially a consensual euroisation40.  Indeed, a
consensual euroisation (i.e. an euroisation in accord with EU officials)
presents some advantages as an alternative to both unilateral euroi-
sation and a regulated introduction of the euro.  Consider first the
potential advantages, for both parties, of a consensual euroisation with
a minimal degree of acceptance by EU officials and then the other
proposed refinements in the relevant literature to ensure the success
of euroisation.
At minimum, a consensual euroisation should be allowed to fix the
conversion rate for the currency in agreement with EU officials, that is,
on a multilateral basis, as in the case of a regulated introduction of
euro.  This is different from unilateral euroisation, since in that case the
adopting country has complete freedom to choose the conversion rate
for its currency against the euro.  For the EU, it would make it possible
to avoid the risk of a devaluation at the time of the unilateral adoption
of the euro– feared by some– for a temporary gain in competi-
tiveness41.  For the euroising country, it would avoid the trap posed
by ERM-II and the criterion of exchange rate stability would be de facto
fulfilled.  The exchange rate risk premium against the euro would
disappear, inducing ceteris paribus a decrease in interest rates.  In this
regard, a consensual euroisation would give a better outcome than
unilateral euroisation in confining an early introduction of the euro
within a controlled and structured process (even if outside the Treaty).
Then, by reassuring the financial markets, the probability of changes in
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40. This point was previously noted by Bratkowski and Rostowski (2001) for unilateral euroi-
sation.  We put more emphasis on the fact that consensual euroisation, even with a minimal
degree of acceptance by EU officials, would ensure to a greater extent the fulfilment of the goals.
41. Nevertheless, the fear of a devaluation is probably over-stated.  Potentially euroising
countries have little room for manoeuvre since it would put at risk other equilibria.  A devaluation
would initially induce an increase in imported inflation while the gain in competitiveness would be
presumably only temporary, because of price flexibility.  Then, the real exchange rate of euroising
countries would be under-valued for only a short period.
the default risk would be substantially decreased.  In turn, both private
and public investment would be boosted, putting economic growth on
a higher trajectory.  The debt service would be reduced, facilitating the
fulfilment of both public deficit and debt criteria.  If inflationary
pressures mainly come from the BS effect, the inflation criteria would
in any case benefit neither from euroisation nor from a regulated intro-
duction of the euro.  The key issue is then that of non-adequacy (and
then relaxation) in the inflation criteria for catching-up economies.  Even
in the case of a wage-inflation spiral or budgetary expenditures as
important sources of inflation, the “catalyst effect” can operate, at first
sight, whatever way the euro is introduced.  To sum up, euroisation,
especially on a consensual basis, would facilitate the fulfilment of
Maastricht criteria (except the one relating to inflation), with presumably
positive effects on the CEECs’ real growth.  
Under this scenario (called “minimal degree of acceptance” by EU
officials), euroising countries would not be allowed to join EMU and its
institutions nor to participate in ECB monetary policy decisions.  One
option, proposed by Bratkowski and Rostowski (2001), would consist
in admitting euroising countries to EMU once they have demonstrated
sustainable nominal convergence with the present members.  Thus, the
arguments against their insufficient “stability culture” to enter EMU and
its institutions are no longer relevant.  Bratkowski and Rostowski (2001)
even argue that euroisation makes it harder for a country to join EMU
with temporarily non-BS inflationary pressures because of the unavail-
ability of nominal appreciation, which is present under ERM-II.
Moreover, while the main purpose of the inflation criterion is to demon-
strate a country’s commitment to low inflation before its admission to
the EMU, euroisation provides the same demonstration because, at the
time it adopts the euro, a country does not know when it will be
admitted to EMU, and thus when it will begin to participate in ECB
decisions.  In that case, euroisation would be consistent with the
sequencing and economic rationale for entering EMU highlighted in EU
Treaties: a sustainable nominal convergence should be reached prior to
entering EMU institutions.  
To ensure a more successful euroisation, some authors recommend
more international involvement.  First, to avoid the risk of bank illiq-
uidity in euroising countries, some propose the creation of a special
fund.  For instance, a contingency fund consisting of flexible credit lines
with foreign banks or monetary authorities could be negotiated, using
future tax revenues as collateral (Cohen, 2003).  In our view, a liquidity
fund would reinforce the aforementioned virtuous circle, based on the
need for the abolition of the exchange rate risk premium not to be
compensated by an increase in the default risk.  It could benefit banks
in euroising countries that are not affiliates of foreign parent companies.
Second, some others (Gros, 2002; Altig, 2002; Habib, 2001) propose
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a seigniorage-sharing agreement with the ECB to compensate for the
once-and-for-all cost of replacing a currency (Habib, 2001) or because
“there is no reason that poor countries pay for the rich EU” (Gros, 2002,
in the case of euroisation in the Balkans).
To conclude, in the absence of credible sanctions against euroisation,
a consensual euroisation would be mutually advantageous for both
parties, including the EU.  Moreover, intangible benefits, such as the
status and prestige that go with more extensive cross-border use of
the euro, would accrue to the EU.  In particular, the EU would enjoy
even more prestige by accepting a consensual euroisation than by
opposing unilateral euroisation without credibility.  Granted, it can be
argued that it might open the door to massive euroisation.
Nevertheless, as euroisation represents a major change of system and
a risky experience with especially uncertain benefits, we think that only
countries which derive strong net gains from euroisation, independently
of the EU officials’ agreement, would undertake an euroisation process.
As noted by Sulling (2002), the provisions in the Treaties that define
the institutional path for the introduction of the euro were drawn up
at a time when the euro did not yet exist.  With the creation of EMU,
however, countries were offered new opportunities for the choice of
exchange rate regime, including the possibility of euroisation, and this
then opened the way for a new trade-off.  Given the possible optimality
of euroisation for some countries, a revision of relevant Treaty provi-
sions might be welcome, stipulating in which cases and under what
conditions, EU officials would be prone to engage in a process of
consensual euroisation.
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